The definition of a Booby-Trap according to the Rhodesian Corps of Engineers (RhE) training pamphlet was as follows:

A booby trap is a cunning contrivance, usually of an explosive and lethal nature, designed to catch the unwary enemy; a savage practical joke. It is aimed directly at the reduction of morale and mobility, both of which are vitally important to success in war.“.

In this post I would like to recall two occasions where I was tasked by my higher HQ to lay Booby-Traps. These operations were to take place in the Operation Tangent area and were to be sighted in such a way that terrorists would be well into the kill-zone before the traps were initiated, meaning that we were going for maximum gook casualties. Concealment of the entire set-up was therefore of critical importance, and this includes clandestine insertion of the Booby-Trap team, as we knew that there were eyes and ears everywhere in the bush. We therefore had to apply counter surveillance techniques from insertion to extraction as it is pointless to lay a Booby-Trap that can be seen, or the laying team are observed moving into the target area.

Without going into too much detail, Booby-Traps can be initiated (set-off) by a number of actions, the most popular at the time being the application of pressure, the release of pressure, pull, pull (or tension) release, or the application of some form of Delay. There are many other ways that Booby-Traps can be initiated but I am not going to cover these here. We had specially manufactured devices known as switches, available to us, however for the specific tasks that I was to lead on we would be using Pressure switches only. In other words the required action for success was for someone or something to stand on the pressure switch for the Booby-Trap to detonate. Please note that I used the term “someone or something” as these devices cannot tell friend from foe and would therefore activate the trap regardless of who or what applied the pressure. Sadly animals and friendly forces have been collateral damage to these devices on a number of occasions causing death or injury. The following illustrations show the abovementioned methods in simple to understand detail:

Looking at the previous paragraphs, my readers will appreciate that there are a number of fundamental pre-requisites for a successful Booby-Trap result. One does not simply pick a spot on a map and Booby-Trap it and there are a number of basic principles that we observed when sighting and laying Booby-Traps, and these are as follows:

  1. Concealment: The charges and mechanisms must be concealed or made to resemble some harmless object. The surroundings should be disturbed as little as possible and all signs of preparation should be concealed or removed.
  2. Constricted Localities: The more constricted the site in which a trap is laid the more chance there is of its being sprung and the greater the difficulty of detection and clearance. Any form of defile is therefore a suitable site for boobytraps.
  3. Concentration of Traps: Traps should be laid, whenever possible, in considerable concentrations to reduce the chances of finding them all without springing some. Dummies should be used freely.
  4. Double bluff: An obvious trap may be used to mask a well concealed trap near by.
  5. Inconvenience: Traps may be operated by the removal of obstacles such as road blocks and demolitions, or of furniture or litter in dug-outs or buildings, particularly if these are suitable for headquarters.
  6. Curiosity: The handling of souvenirs, pictures, food and drink containers, musical instruments, weapons, etc, may operate a trap.
  7. Everyday operations: Traps may be operated by opening or closing doors or windows, using telephones or electric light switches etc.
  8. Attraction: Delay-action or incendiary bombs may attract personnel to a booby trapped site.
  9. Alternative methods of firing: A trap may be provided with two or more methods of firing.
  10. Variety: As many different types as possible should be employed in any one locality.

Before continuing I would like to be clear on what I was expected to achieve on both missions and you will note that this ties in closely with the foregoing paragraphs:

  1. Inflict maximum casualties on the enemy.
  2. Use Pressure as the initiating action.
  3. Use of the following Principles – Concealment, Constricted Localities, Concentration of Traps, Alternative methods of firing and Variety.
  4. Covert infiltration to laying site
  5. Operational Security (Opsec)

A brief description of the two missions are as follows:

Mission 1

  1. Operational Area: Tangent
  2. Environment: Forest
  3. Type of Booby-Trap: Multi-device, pressure operated
  4. Concealment method: Existing vegetation
  5. Explosives to be used: Date expired Air Force and Army ordnance
  6. Insertion: Vehicle and night-march

Mission 2

  1. Operational Area: Tangent
  2. Environment: Existing dirt road
  3. Type of Booby-Trap: Multi-device, pressure operated
  4. Concealment method: Existing soil on dirt road
  5. Explosives to be used: Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines
  6. Insertion: Boat and night-march

In the next post I will describe in detail Mission 1 and Mission 2.

The previous posts focussing on laying Cordon Sanitaire took more time and research than I thought they would.  These operations were truly the Rhodesian Corps of Engineers own private battle within the Rhodesian Bush War.  Thanks to the input of former Rhodesian Sappers (and in some cases, non-Sappers), I think we have managed to bring those challenging days to life once again.  As I mentioned in a foregoing post, I feel enriched and privileged to have been part of these operations.  It was and still is an honour to have shared the hardships and dangers with that very special Band of Brothers.  Mukumbura will never be forgotten.

There will be more on Cordon Sanitaire later but now is not the time.  These future posts will fall under the main title of Cordon Sanitaire Phase 2 (Minefield Maintenance).  In so many ways this was the biggest challenge we had as a Corps.  The dangers faced by maintenance crews were far greater than those faced during the laying of the Cordon which in relation to this blog was Phase 1.  Indeed, the majority of Rhodesian Engineer fatalities and serious injuries were a result of minefield maintenance operations.  As a Regular Army sergeant I commanded minefield maintenance operations at both the Deka Minefield and the Victoria Falls Encirclement and will discuss both of these at a later stage.

For now it is time to say farewell to Operation Hurricane as we move to the Operation Tangent area (see map below).

The next post will start off with my recollections as a boat operator on the Zambezi River, based at Deka Camp and operating out of Sibankwazi with the British South Africa Police (BSAP).

Corsan Map_All

Interesting times indeed and I hope that you will continue the journey with me.

Please also have a look at my website dedicated to Rhodesian and South African Military Engineers.  Please join us on the forums by using the following link:

http://www.sasappers.net/forum/index.php

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© Mark Richard Craig and Fatfox9’s Blog, 2009-2014. Unauthorised use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this blog’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited.

If I thought that getting historical background to Cordon Sanitaire defoliation efforts (see previous post) was challenging, I was wrong!

Trying to find anyone who has in-depth information on the electronic early warning systems installed on the fences was an even more daunting task. To be very honest I am not in any way convinced that what I have managed to find holds too much water and this is once again where I will be hoping that someone, somewhere reads this post, tells me I have written complete rubbish and puts things right. I can take it and no offence will be taken I assure you. We simply need to get this as factual as we can. There has to be Rhodesian Army veterans that actually installed and monitored the electronic side of things that can help here.

The following redaction comes from more than one source, the reliability of which has not been confirmed to me. From an intelligence source and reliability perspective I therefore have no option but to rate it as F/6 (Insufficient information to evaluate reliability. May or may not be reliable/The validity of the information cannot be determined) and should therefore by no means be quoted as being the way things actually were. Read on………..

For the sake of simplicity we will consider the Cordon to be 25 metres wide, fenced on both sides, and containing anti-personnel blast mines.

On the home side a system of electronic sensors divided into monitored sectors and wired to sector control boxes formed the basis of the early warning system. I have not been able to find any information as to what type of sensors (movement, vibration, broken electrical circuit, audio, etc.) were used, nor who was responsible for installing them (possibly the Rhodesian Corps of Signals (8 Signal Squadron)).  According to one source these control boxes were placed in bunkers close to the home side fence and manned full-time by troops waiting for an alarm to be set off.

Logic makes me think that a combination of activation triggers may have been used. Apparently the idea was that any penetration of the Cordon would be detected by detonations or some form of electronic sensor. My information claims that reaction to these events was primarily by vehicle and took place within 10 minutes of a signal being received. In addition to the vehicular response, artillery fire was also used to put down fire on ranged, pre-selected targets. I imagine this would be from 25 pounder howitzers or possibly 120mm mortars.

It is my understanding that the only parts of Cordon Sanitaire to be fitted with an electronic early warning system were the Musengezi/Mukumbura, and Nyamapanda to Ruenya minefield. Soon after these areas were completed a significant amount of false alarms were being recorded. This resulted in finding no enemy presence at the alarm trigger point. Due to the significant cost of ammunition being expended on these false-positive events, it was decided to curtail the rapid response on these areas in 1975. An ongoing Cordon Sanitaire review shelved the whole idea of an early warning system shortly thereafter.

And so ended the Cordon Sanitaire early warning system.

I do not know how effective these measures were as I never encountered them during my time serving in the Rhodesian Corps of Engineers. Personally I do not think the electronic system was as successful as the planners initially thought it would be and with the Rhodesian economy heavily burdened by sanctions and an ever-increasing defence budget there was little chance of any project surviving unless it showed significant success indicators (body count, infiltration mitigation, etc.).

I located the following on the issafrica.org website.  They seem to confirm in some ways parts of the foregoing:

EWS 1EWS 2EWS 3

I will continue to seek further sources to help unravel this interesting and little known subject.

Please also have a look at my website dedicated to Rhodesian and South African Military Engineers.  Please join us on the forums by using the following link:

http://www.sasappers.net/forum/index.php

Copyright

© Mark Richard Craig and Fatfox9’s Blog, 2009-2014. Unauthorised use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this blog’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited.

Mukumbura………to any Rhodesian Sapper worth his/her salt the name conjures up Cordon Sanitaire operations.  Indeed to most of us this was the Mother of all Rhodesian Cordon Sanitaire operations.  However there were other areas where we laid mines, usually along the conventional lines of what I have described previously, but also some in more unconventional ways (will describe these in future posts).

Here is a diagram showing the extent of Cordon Sanitaire operations throughout Rhodesia.  It also shows the various operational areas:

Corsan Map_All

I would like to point out the following:

1.  This map is not to scale

2.  The information is to the best of my knowledge/memory correct (but fairly accurate and I do not suggest walking on the red bits).

3.  Red bits (added by me) denote armed Cordon Sanitaire strips.

4.  Base map courtesy of shelf3d.

Known mined areas:

1.  220 kilometers: Victoria Falls to Mlibizi

2.  359 kilometers: Musengetsi to Nyamapanda to Ruwenya

3.  72 kilometers: Junction Gate to Jersey Tea Estate to Muzite Mission

4.  50 kilometers: Stapleford Forest to Umtali

5.  61 kilometers: Malvernia/Villa Salazar to Crooks Corner

6.  +-1 kilometer: Kariba Power Station

Not all of the areas above were laid to the same pattern.  Some were standard pattern, others double-density, and some contained additional trip-wire operated fragmentation stake-mines.  The double-density/trip-wire minefields were the most dangerous for us to work in, especially when carrying out minefield maintenance tasks.  I will show diagrams of these variants in future posts to give you a better idea what they looked like and what we were up against.

The above information (Rupiah) is probably reasonably accurate distance wise but definitely does not account for what I will call “other” mined/booby-trapped areas.  I know these “other” areas exist because I laid some of them while serving on special operations.  My conclusion regarding these “other” areas is therefore that they remain unknown and uncleared.

Please also have a look at my website dedicated to Rhodesian and South African Military Engineers.  Please join us on the forums by using the following link:

http://www.sasappers.net/forum/index.php

Copyright

© Mark Richard Craig and Fatfox9’s Blog, 2009-2014. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this blog’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited.